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Abstract—Modern tactical operations have complex commu-
nication and computing requirements, often involving different
coalition teams, that cannot be supported by today’s mobile
ad hoc networks. To this end, the emerging Software Defined
Networking (SDN) paradigm has the potential to enable the
redesign and successful deployment of these systems. In this
paper, we propose a set of novel architecture designs for SDN-
enabled mobile ad hoc networks in the tactical field. We discuss in
detail the challenges raised by the ad hoc and coalition network
environment, and we present specific solutions to address them.
The proposed approaches build on evidence from experimental
evaluation of such architectures and leverage recent theoretical
results from SDN deployments in large backbone networks.
I. INTRODUCTION
Today’s tactical communications involve convoluted and
dynamic patterns of information circulation or processing,
and raise challenges that are not encountered in commercial
systems. Indeed, we currently lack the necessary tools for
designing communication systems that can efficiently support
the full spectrum of tactical missions. Moreover, the distance
between state-of-the-art solutions and the military needs grows
fast, as the latter become increasingly complex. This fact has
driven Department of Defense (DoD) agencies to repeatedly
and emphatically outline the priorities of tactical communica-
tions, calling both academia and industry for actions towards
a research breakthrough.
A. The Operational Requirements
One of the main requirements for modern military com-
munication systems is to support tactical field operations in
areas without infrastructure. A method that has been long
considered as the ultimate solution to achieve this goal is
the deployment of Mobile Ad hoc Networks (MANETs).
These are envisioned as fully decentralized systems with self-
organizing capabilities, hence having the required robustness
and scalability. Nevertheless, the MANETs that are currently
deployed at the edge, function at a basic level, and suffer
from issues such as complex configuration requirements and
protocol overhead due to network topology changes.
An additional requirement that arose recently for tactical
MANETs is the increasing need to support coalition opera-
tions. This latter term describes communication between teams
of soldiers (or, other actors in the tactical field) that belong
to different command centers or even different nations. The
role of a coalition network is to enable the circulation of
information, such as mission data, while ensuring that sharing
of sensitive information is no wider than necessary, which is
known as the “need-to-know” (NTK) principle. Despite the
army efforts in this area, e.g., the Multilateral Interoperability
Program run by several nations, we lack mechanisms that
achieve the necessary coalition interoperability.
B. The Opportunity
The above operational requirements at the tactical level raise
technical issues which are very challenging to address. At the
same time, the networking community witnesses today the
advent of Software Defined Networking. SDN constitutes a
paradigm shift as it enables a full or partial decoupling of
network control and data forwarding operations, and brings
unprecedented programmability to network management [1].
Therefore, a question that unavoidably arises is: How can we
leverage SDN to design tactical ad hoc networks?
At a first glance, SDN seems a promising solution for en-
abling the deployment of tactical MANETs. First, the currently
prevalent approach for completely decentralized MANET ar-
chitectures is, likely, one of the main reasons they are not
used at large. This philosophy can be revisited with SDN,
which offers centralized control and network-wide view, and
indeed there are already suggestions for employing SDN
in MANETs [2]. Moreover, in coalition tactical operations
SDN can facilitate flexible routing and dynamic transport-
level decisions, thus enabling information circulation based
on mission-specific criteria and the NTK constraints. This op-
portunity has been identified by military and industry experts
[3]. Nevertheless, currently it is not clear which architectures
are suitable for these SDN-enabled mobile networks, what are
the key system parameters that affect their performance, and
how we can optimize them.
In this paper we make a first step towards addressing,
in a systematic fashion, the above issues. First, we address
the design of SDN-enabled MANETs, or SMANETs, as the
next generation of tactical ad hoc networks. We provide the
blueprint of a SMANET, including the system architecture for
the mobile nodes. The foremost issue here is to decide where
to place and how to organize the SDN control logic (con-
trollers) in the network. These decisions essentially shape the
performance of the SMANET. We explain how these decisions
can be optimized, and we provide supporting evidence from
testbed evaluations of such ad hoc schemes.
Next, we focus on the data plane, i.e., the data forwarding
nodes. Here, the following two issues are important. First,
tactical networks, and especially coalition networks, will often
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Fig. 1: Modern Tactical Environment. Tactical communication networks include edge-networking components, multi-hop
and multi-path data flows, and coalition networks to support cross-team communications.
comprise a large number of heterogeneous network elements.
For example, some teams or soldiers therein, may not have
SDN-enhanced radio nodes. This will result in hybrid systems
where SDN data plane nodes co-exist with legacy nodes that
use non-SDN routing protocols. The key technical question
here is to decide where to deploy the SDN forwarding elements
and how to use them. Second, current SDN proposals rely
on the centralized controller to update all forwarding rules at
the data plane nodes. In tactical networks with high level of
dynamism and frequent network failures, this centralization
will result in slow network updates, as well as significant
controller overhead. Hence, a second question is how to make
data plane nodes to autonomously react to network changes,
but at the same time preserve the benefits of centralized
control. We explain that these decisions are heavily affected by
the operational needs, involve intricate optimization problems
and we present approaches for tackling them.
The rest of this paper is organized as follows: in Sec-
tion II we provide some background on tactical and SDN
research. In Section III we propose a novel architecture for
SDN-enabled MANETs, analyze their performance limits, and
discuss various control plane design approaches. Section IV
focuses on the data plane of the tactical network, considering
scenarios of hybrid SDN deployment and semi-autonomous
data forwarding elements, and provides methodologies for
optimizing its operation. We conclude and discuss the road
ahead in Section V.
II. BACKGROUND AND CURRENT STATE
In this section, we discuss the operational requirements in
modern tactical missions and the technical communication
challenges.
A. Modern Tactical Operations
Modern military missions include a large number of diverse
actors (soldiers, vehicles, etc.) who may operate independently,
in coordination with each other, or in sync with command
centers. The latter are fixed or deployable infrastructures,
often airborne (e.g., drones), that work in a semi-autonomous
fashion serving the actors or bridging them with higher-level
commands. The actors might be organized in different groups,
e.g., belonging to different commands, that have independent
or intertwined goals. An instance of a modern tactical envi-
ronment and the envisaged communication support is depicted
in Figure 1.
Military missions increasingly rely on timely information
which has to be collected through sensors, and processed
in the tactical field, e.g., in handheld devices or in the
cloud. Besides, DoD agencies such as DARPA have recently
called for the development of mission-aware computation and
communication systems1. They also emphasize the importance
of programmable networks that enable dynamic in-network
decisions, such as path selection and bandwidth provisioning.
Due to these requirements, MANETs are even more important
today as they need to support field ad hoc communications and
also provide multi-hop connectivity to command centers.
Moreover, the equipment in modern tactical missions in-
cludes heterogeneous network and computing elements, such
as various mobile radios and field sensors. These systems have
particular constraints, e.g., operate on tight energy budgets,
and this introduces various performance versus lifetime trade-
offs. At the same time, this equipment often operates in
adversarial environments and hence needs to be robust in
link and other failures, as well as to several types of security
attacks.
B. MANETs and Coalition Operations: What is missing
One of the main challenges in MANETs is efficient rout-
ing, and various protocols have been proposed to address
it, e.g., the Optimized Link State Routing (OLSR). These
solutions can result in intermittent connectivity, long-lasting
disconnections or may generate excessive protocol overhead
due to frequent topology changes. Moreover, they are not
1See, for example, Dispersed Computing DARPA-BAA-16-41, and
Content-Based Mobile Edge Networking, DARPA-BAA-11-51, as well the
Federated Mission Networking (FMN) concept by NATO.
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Fig. 2: Blueprint of the proposed SDN-enabled MANET architecture. SDN local controllers (denoted by "S") receive the
network policies from the cloudlet (global controller) and configure accordingly the end-nodes under their supervision.
flexible enough to adapt to the new operational requirements
described above. Delay-tolerant networking has been proposed
to address the connectivity problem, but this covers only a
narrow slice of the military missions. The common denomi-
nator of these prior efforts is the focus on fully decentralized
architectures which is perceived as a prerequisite for achieving
the necessary level of robustness. However, with the full or
partial separation of control and data planes, SDN can provide
the level of network view and centralized control that was
missing to implement complex mission-critical applications.
Coalition networks is a relatively new operational require-
ment. The main problems that have been studied so far are
mobility support, interoperability and scalability [4]. The tra-
ditional routing protocol used for the communication between
coalition members is the Border Gateway Protocol. BGP
was initially designed to exchange reachability information
between autonomous systems (AS) in wireline networks. How-
ever, BGP cannot support mobility, nor has the adaptability
that is necessary for the tactical domain. A way to prevent
network fragmentation is by using a virtual router for each
AS domain, but this raises scalability issues [5]. Besides,
prior proposals for selecting the gateways and ensuring cross-
domain secure connections, albeit very important, cannot cope
with fast changing missions nor support detailed NTK policies.
SDN brings the network programmability dimension that can
potentially overcome these obstacles.
C. The Advent of SDN
There is a fast increasing volume of research in the area
of SDN [1]. The vast majority of these studies refer to
wireline infrastructures, i.e., ISP networks and data centers.
A technical issue that has received considerable attention
is the design of programmatic languages aiming to develop
interfaces that are fully-flexible and scalable. This will enable
network administrators to configure the data plane as needed,
and design application-specific traffic control policies.
Few recent works have attempted to apply these ideas to
wireless networks. For example, [6] proposed to exploit SDN
and shift control functions from core gateways to middle
boxes. This can eliminate management bottlenecks by de-
centralizing the network operation. On the other hand, [7]
suggested the deployment of software defined radio access
networks (RAN). The idea is to assign the management of
multiple base stations to a global controller and with this
unified control improve performance. An interesting point
is the suggestion for splitting the control decisions to those
requiring full information (hence assigned to the global con-
troller) and to those that need fast response (assigned to the
radio elements). Going a step further to the data plane, [8]
proposed to turn the base stations to fully programmable nodes
facilitating this way the virtualization of network resources.
The above developments manifest that small, yet solid
steps have been made towards designing softwarized wireless
networks. Interestingly, there have been also efforts to deploy
SDN soft switches even to handheld devices, see [2] and
references therein. This manifests the actual potential for
deploying SDN-enabled ad hoc networks. However, as it is
explained below, there are many open issues that we need to
address if we wish to apply these ideas to tactical ad hoc
networks.
III. SMANET ARCHITECTURE DESIGN
This section discusses the design of SDN-enabled
MANETs, or SMANETs. We present below a set of key
questions that arise when a SMANET architecture is designed,
and provide suggestions for addressing them in a systematic
way. This means that the architecture is tailored to the specific
operational requirements, environment conditions, and capa-
bilities of the equipment.
An example blueprint of the proposed SMANET architec-
ture is illustrated in Figure 2. Here, two local SDN controllers
are installed on portable stations that are in proximity with
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the mobile nodes. Each of them is able to view only a part of
the network graph, and has to collect and send the respective
network state information to the higher-level SDN controller
located at a cloudlet. This global controller will construct the
universal graph topology, devise the operation policies and
disseminate them to the forwarding nodes through the local
controllers. The latter can serve as bridges, or even take full
control when the infrastructure connection is disrupted, or the
data path queries need to be served in real time.
A key challenge in SMANETs is to determine the SDN
controller architecture. This requires to decide both the place-
ment and organization of controllers in the network. Regarding
placement, a straightforward option is to place one controller
to manage all the data forwarding devices in the network.
Schemes that place many controllers have been proposed in the
context of wired networks (e.g., see [9] and [10]). Regarding
organization, the controllers need to be organized in such a
way so as to be able to coordinate their actions in collecting
network statistics, maintaining a consistent view of the net-
work state (topology, traffic load, etc.) and sharing the burden
of data path query service. For example, in a flat organization,
all the controllers maintain the same network state and can
serve all the applications [11]. In a hierarchical controller
organization, as in Fig. 2, however, different controllers will
be able to serve different applications.
It is clear that in SMANETs the controllers can be placed
in several locations such as the command centers, portable
wireless infrastructure, or the mobile equipment. A proper
approach to make these design decisions is by considering the
pros and cons of each architecture. Namely, having a central
controller at a cloud server allows to configure all devices
at once, but raises scalability concerns and may introduce
non-negligible delays for policy updates. Therefore, for small
groups of soldiers, and when there is strong connectivity with
the controller, this is a proper solution. On the other hand,
placing the controller on a field platform allows SMANETs
to control faster the forwarding elements (lower latency), to
monitor the usage of wireless resources in real time, and
mitigate interference. However, this might induce problems of
consistency as the local controller might take locally-optimal
but globally-inefficient decisions. Thus, finding a controller
placement that ensures the fair trade-off between the different
objectives is needed [10]. A third option is to place the
controllers at mobile nodes (e.g., the soldiers’ equipment) so
as to increase autonomicity and robustness to infrastructure
link failures. However, this option should be carefully consid-
ered as the overheads might drain these resource-constrained
devices.
At this point, it is important to quantify the above trade-
offs. To this end, we can take lessons from recent results
in mobile SDN systems. In particular, in our recent work
[2], we experimented with SDN-enhanced portable Android
devices coordinated by a global controller located in a clouldet.
The goal was to provide a proof-of-concept prototype for a
cloud-controlled ad hoc network where certain mobile devices
will act as gateways, connecting other nearby client-nodes
or aggregating multiple flows to satisfy throughput-hungry
services. Extensive trials showed that such systems are tech-
nically feasible but have certain limitations and might induce
important overheads.
Regarding the reconfigurability of the SDN-enhanced de-
vices, we observed that an end-user (client device) can switch
between gateways very fast, i.e., even every 20 seconds, while
having an active connection with a distant server, e.g., for
downloading a large file such as a map. The experimental
set up is outlined in Figure 3. Nevertheless, more frequent
reconfigurations consume significant battery energy (more
than 20%, compared to the no-configurations benchmark)
and induce non-negligible delays (more than 25%). On the
other hand, updating the global controller (which was located
within 1Km distance) with the current network status, did not
consume significant device resources and could be even as
frequent as every 3 seconds. Obviously, the actual numbers
depend on a set of parameters, e.g., the number of hops
for each flow, the physical distance of the devices, and so
on. However, it is already clear which are the performance-
cost trade-offs that should be carefully considered when one
designs such architectures.
Clearly, a systematic optimization approach is needed to
design the controller architecture in SMANETs. A particular
521
3
4
5
6 7
8
Compromised 
node
NTK-based 
routing policies
NTK 
requirements
Team A Team B
Receives both 
identity credentials
& troop location
Receives only
troop location
<Source, Dest., Access id> 
Forwarding Table of Node 2
Action
<1,  3,  Credentials> Forward to 3
<1,  3,  Location> Forward to 3
<1,  8,  Credentials> Drop
<1,  8,  Location> Forward to 4
Coalition operations
among 2 tactical teams
Fig. 4: A coalition network example. Two tactical teams form an SDN-enabled mobile ad hoc network. The example focuses
on the forwarding table of node 2, which employs access ids so as to manage information according to the NTK principle.
useful toolbox for devising placement policies is facility
location theory. However, typical algorithms do not directly
apply because of the practical constraints arising in SMAN-
ETs. Hence, the controller placement has to be casted as a
discrete optimization problem that takes into consideration the
topology of the network (available positions and their reach
to forwarders), the applications and the network policies that
realize them, the overhead of communicating the policies to
data path, the cost for circulating the state synchronization
messages among controllers (which depends on the controller
organization), security and other special requirements of tac-
tical operations, and the battery energy limitations of the
devices. The controller placement can be also combined with
other practical methods that increase network lifetime such as
equipping a part of the nodes with power banks.
IV. SMANET DATA PLANE OPTIMIZATION
The data plane of a SMANET can benefit significantly by
optimal design approaches. Consider for example the network
in Figure 4 with eight SDN-enabled data plane nodes (soldiers
and vehicles). The members of the two coalition teams should
be able to exchange critical battlefield information, such as
identity credentials and troop locations, but Team B members
should have access only to the location data (because of NTK
constraints). Using conventional protocols, like BGP and its
extensions for tactical ad hoc networks [5], it is difficult to
enforce such detailed routing policies. With SDN however,
forwarding rules can match on a variety of header fields and
not just the destination address. Hence, bespoken policies can
be implemented to support the operational requirements. In
the above scenario for example, one could install rules that
forward packets based on the triplet (source id, destination
id, access id), where the flag access id captures the NTK
requirements for each packet. This way, node 2 will forward
identity credential packets only when they are destined to a
Team A node; otherwise they will be dropped.
The above example highlighted the benefits of the extra
design space brought by SDN in implementing detailed infor-
mation exchange policies. An important, yet challenging, task
is how to implement even more complex policies [6]. In the
rest of this section, we emphasize two factors that make this
task even more challenging in the context of tactical networks.
A. Factor 1: Hybrid SDN Deployment
In tactical networks, SDN data plane nodes will often
co-exist (interfacing through Eastbound APIs) with legacy
nodes that use standard legacy routing protocols. An important
question in such hybrid systems is to determine where to
deploy the SDN forwarding elements, e.g., which soldiers
or vehicles should be equipped with SDN switches. These
decisions are constrained by various factors. For example, each
team may have only a certain number of SDN radios (budget),
or during a mission there might exist limited time-windows for
executing (or, reorganizing) such equipment upgrades.
Each SDN deployment decision impacts not only the node
itself (the one being upgraded) but its 1-hop neighbors and
even more distant nodes. To understand this, let us focus again
on Figure 4. When node 2 is the only node that is upgraded
to SDN, the NTK requirements for the flows emanating from
node 1 can be satisfied. However, it is not possible with
this deployment to satisfy additional requirements such as
dynamically deciding not to route traffic through node 5 (e.g.,
when node 5 becomes suspicious of being compromised).
Node 2 can override the OLSR shortest path (i.e., the path
(2,5,8) with the minimum hop length) by routing the packets
destined to node 8 through node 4 instead of node 5. In this
case, the packets will follow the shortest path connecting node
4 with 8, i.e., the path (4,5,8). Nevertheless, both nodes 2 and
4 need to be upgraded to SDN in order to be able to route
traffic through the secure path (2,4,6,7,8).
For the SDN deployment we can, to some extent, leverage
results from previous studies that considered this problem in
ISP backbone networks. In particular, in our recent work [12],
we presented greedy-based approximations which maximize
the number of routing paths that are dynamically selectable
though the SDN nodes. Our methodology was based on the
theory of submodular functions. While this constitutes a first
step in addressing the SDN deployment problem, SMANETs
bring novel challenges. For example, in certain scenarios the
actors not only move, but change drastically their relative po-
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sitions. This might render previous SDN deployment decisions
sub-optimal, and a re-arrangement might be necessary.
B. Factor 2: Need for Autonomous Actions
Tactical networks will exhibit high level of dynamism and
frequent network failures. At the same time, quick reactions
will be required. Unfortunately, the fully centralized control
paradigm of SDN, where the controller installs all the forward-
ing rules, will often result in unacceptably slow policy updates.
Hence, a critical question here is how to make data plane nodes
to autonomously and quickly react to network changes, but at
the same time preserve the benefits of centralized control.
Table I outlines two approaches for enabling autonomous
actions in SMANETs. The first approach is rather straight-
forward and suggests to use a distributed MANET protocol
as-a-backup to SDN control. When link failures are detected,
the data plane nodes can run a legacy MANET protocol to
re-route traffic through alternative paths. Still, the complex
network applications may be managed by the SDN controller,
and the MANET protocols can be complementary so as to
ensure that basic connectivity is restored.
The second approach is to revisit SDN’s philosophy of
separating control and data planes, and delegate some level
of control to data plane nodes. This can be realized by pre-
computing and pushing to data plane nodes locally-executable
code fragments that realize control functions. An API to
program such functions was proposed in [13]. If the data
plane nodes are enhanced with the ability to perform statefull
forwarding actions, as in OpenState [14], then these functions
can take the form of state-dependent forwarding rules. An
example of this approach is depicted in Figure 5. The SDN
controller pro-actively computes and installs state-dependent
forwarding rules at node 1 to overcome the failure of the
link to node 2. In fact, such statefull data plane actions are
promoted by popular SDN programming languages.
The first approach is quite simple to implement. Neverthe-
less, in practice, the MANET protocol can take long time to
converge and be too simple to support complex mission appli-
cations. On the other hand, the control delegation approach can
achieve instantaneous reaction to link failures, but it requires
the computation of the code fragments, which can be a very
complex problem (especially in large networks with complex
Reaction Approach Pros Cons
MANET backup Simplicity Operation constrained byMANET protocol
Delegation of control Fast reaction High complexityNeed a common platform
TABLE I: Reaction approaches for SDN data plane.
policies). Besides, a common code execution platform on all
data plane nodes is needed. Developing a method that is both
lightweight and agile in terms of reaction to network changes
is still an open research problem.
V. DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSIONS
SDN is still at its infancy stage in mobile networks, but
there is growing consensus that it can be a game-changing
force. Ad hoc networking is probably the most challenging
area that SDN can be used, but at the same time one that
can benefit the most from this new technology. Exploring this
potential is of paramount importance not only for the military
tactical networks, but for all services and applications that can
be supported by ad hoc wireless networks.
In this paper we focused on tactical MANETs and the addi-
tional challenges that coalitional operations raise. We studied
a new generation of SDN-enabled MANETs, the SMANETs.
It was explained that the centralization that SDN brings can
help alleviate the inefficiencies of the decentralized MANET
designs of the past. At the same time, SDN can maintain
the network agility and autonomicity that tactical operations
require. Importantly, SDN offers the means to easily configure
and re-configure the nodes based on policy, mission objectives
and battlefield condition changes. Hybrid SDN networks are
an inescapable intermediate step in the deployment of such
systems, and we provided a set of guidelines for their design.
The importance of SDN for military operations is already
well understood [3], but to date the focus has been for larger-
scale deployments, e.g., see [15] and references there in. Here
we went a step further towards the edge of communication
systems. Despite the useful lessons from recent experiments
and theoretical studies, there are clearly many open challenges.
For example, we need to revisit the discussed mechanisms
to address security issues, such as Denial-of-Service (DoS)
attacks to SDN controllers and data plane nodes. Besides,
7extensive testbed-based evaluations are necessary, similar to
those presented, in order to identify all possible trade-offs and
performance limitations of such systems.
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